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ABSTRACT
The security of mobile communication has become increasingly important with the
development of devices that feature more and more versatile communication function-
ality. The advent of user programmable mobile phones has made it possible to create
third party software that needs security beyond what the network can provide. Third
party software in mobile phones has expanded into areas where the user expects secu-
rity in forms of confidentiality and integrity of data. At the same time this development
has lead into a situation where mobile communication is used in areas such as mobile
commerce and mobile payments. Providers of these kinds of services expect to have
security in the form of strong authentication and non-repudiable transactions.
Both providers and users have their expectations for the security of mobile services.
This thesis discusses these requirements and provides solutions that fulfil the expecta-
tions. Security is required in communication as well as in the storage of data that is
generated as a result of this communication. Software solutions presented in this the-
sis utilise both symmetric and asymmetric ciphers. Symmetric encryption is used to
provide confidentiality of message exchange and authentication, whereas asymmetric
encryption is used for purposes of non-repudiation. Integrity of data is obtained using
hash functions combined with encryption.
Mobile commerce and mobile payment require non-repudiation so that none of the
parties can later deny their participation in transactions they have committed to. Non-
repudiation is obtained by asymmetric encryption using a public key infrastructure
(PKI). The assumption that the private key of the user is possessed only by that user
means that nobody else can create a valid digital signature of that user. In our work
we have used a governmentally administered PKI to implement protocols for mobile
payments. With these protocols secure mobile payments can be achieved both in real
and virtual point-of-sale (POS). Using a governmental PKI the protocol authenticates
citizens instead of customers of a certain financial institution. This means that the
system is open to any merchant, service provider and financial institution.
Secure storage of exchanged messages is important in the case where the device is
accessed by an unauthorised party. This may happen for example if the device is lost
or stolen. The software solutions presented in this thesis allow access to stored data
only to a user with proper credentials.
Security in mobile communication can be achieved with current technology and
equipment. This can, furthermore, be done in a way that can benefit a large audience.
The security level can be set high enough to provide secure financial transactions using
a mobile phone.
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Inspec Thesaurus: security; telecommunication security; security of data; mobile com-
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Abbreviation Description
3G 3rd Generation Mobile Network
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
API Application Programming Interface
BTS Base Transceiver Station
CA Certificate Authority
CLDC Connected Limited Device Configuration
CRL Certificate Revocation List
EMS Emergency Medical Services
EMV Europay-Mastercard-Visa
FINEID Finnish Electronic Identity
FINUID Finnish Electronic Identity User Identification
GPRS General Packet Radio Service
GSM Global System for Mobile communications
FSP Financial Service Provider
HLR Home Location Register
J2ME Java 2 Micro Edition
JAD Java Application Descriptor
JAR Java Archive
JCE Java Cryptography Extension
MIDP Mobile Information Device Profile
MIME Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension
MS Mobile Station (Mobile user)
MSC Mobile services Switching Centre
NFC Near Field Communication)
OCSP Open Certificate Status Protocol
OTA Over The Air provisioning
PKCS12 Public Key Cryptography Standard #12
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
POS Point-of-Sale
PRC Population Register Centre
PSP Payment Service Provider
RA Registration Authority
RFID Radio Frequency Identification
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SAT SIM Application Toolkit
SATSA Security and Trust Services API
SIM Subscriber Identity Module
SMS Short Message Services
TBS To Be Signed
TTP Trusted Third Party
URL Universal Resource Locator
USB Universal Serial Bus
SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol
VLR Visitor Location Register
WAP Wireless Application Protocol
WIM WAP Identity Module
WMA Wireless Messaging API
WSDL Web Service Definition Language
WTK Wireless Toolkit
WTLS Wireless Transport Layer Security
XML Extensible Markup Language
Notation Description
Ki A shared secret key between a mobile user and the home
network
Kc A shared session key between a mobile user and the home
network
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Mobile communications have progressed in a very fast pace. As communication speeds
in mobile environments have increased, developing mobile applications and commu-
nication solutions has become feasible. This has also created new challenges in areas
like security, especially in mobile networks, where being anonymous is easier than be-
fore. Solving security issues, such as strong authentication, confidentiality or privacy
and integrity of data are challenges that have to be considered. Without adequate se-
curity, several areas of applications can not utilise the mobile technology to its fullest
potential.
SMS messages are sometimes used for the interchange of confidential data such as
social security number, bank account number, password etc. A typing error in selecting
a number when sending such a message can have severe consequences if the message
is readable to any non-intended receiver. Most mobile operators encrypt all mobile
communication data, including SMS messages but sometimes this is not the case, and
even when encrypted, the data is readable for the operator. Among others these needs
give rise for the need to develop additional encryption for SMS messages, so that only
accredited parties are able to engage communication. Sometimes SMS messages are
used in mobile commerce, such as buying entrance tickets [30], in which case they may
convey considerable value.
1.1 Security structures of the GSM network
Authentication in the standard GSM network is based on a secret key Ki that is shared
by the mobile device and the home operator. On the mobile device this key is stored in
the SIM card. Each mobile user is assigned an IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber
Identity), which is used to identify the user for billing purposes. Since there is a need
to protect the identity of a user, a TMSI (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity) is
assigned to the user in the authentication procedure and used instead of the IMSI [28].
In the authentication process the MS (Mobile Station) contacts the BTS (Base
Transceiver Station) which in turn contacts the MSC (Mobile Switching Centre). If
the MS is known in the MSC, the TMSI is used as an identity to the MS and the MSC
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probably already has adequate information to authenticate the MS [49]. In case the
MSC has no prior knowledge of the MS, it will ask for the IMSI of the user. Having
the IMSI, the MSC will contact the home network of MS to get the authentication in-
formation. The HLR (Home Location Register) of the home network of MS will then
generate one or more (often five in practise) triplets each containing a random chal-
lenge (RAND) a signed response (SRES) to the challenge RAND and a session key
Kc. SRES and Kc are based on the shared key Ki [28].
Once the MSC has the triplets, it can use them for authenticating the MS. The MSC
sends the MS one of the triplets as a challenge. Since the MS knows Ki it can derive
the SRES as well as the Kc. After the MS has responded with the SRES, the MSC
compares the SRES obtained from the HLR with the one received from the MS and if
they match, concludes that the MS’s claimed identity is authentic. Now the MS and
MSC share the key Kc, which is further used to encrypt the traffic between the MS and
the MSC.
Although somewhat out of the scope of this thesis, there is an attack using a false
base station to find out the IMSI identity of the mobile user. Solutions we present do
not protect the user from this type of an attack and it seems that an obvious solution
to this problem in the current GSM system is not available. The algorithms used to
generate the SRES and encrypt the air-to-air traffic were originally kept secret. Later
on some of these algorithms leaked out to the public and have been analysed by the
scientific community. Several weaknesses have been found in these algorithms, giving
opportunities to attack the system. The GSM encryption can be broken in less than one
second with only few dozen milliseconds of off-the-air conversation [2]. However, as
the next chapter will demonstrate, weaknesses in these algorithms and protecting the
user from them is not the main point of this thesis. We will show that, despite the short-
comings in the security of the GSM network, a scheme can be created which provides
security, integrity, non-repudiation and confidentiality of traffic in SMS messaging and
packet data.
1.2 Built-in security of SMS messaging in the GSM
network
The GSM network only encrypts the air-to-air traffic. The traffic on the operators net-
work is in plaintext [33]. The encryption between the mobile device and the BTS
protects the data from an eavesdropper that listens to the air traffic. However, there is
no security mechanism protecting the data inside the operators network. This means
that the operator can at will listen to any voice communications and read any SMS mes-
sages. Furthermore, the security system does not provide any kind of non-repudiation.
This means that a mobile user can repudiate any message. Since messages travel in
plain text, the network operator can manufacture any message claiming that it was sent
by the mobile user.
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1.3 Desired security features of SMS messaging
As stated before, SMS is a widely used service that is well adopted by the large public.
At the same time SMS technology is available world-wide and, hence, can be utilised
for numerous purposes. A limiting factor, however, in applications such as electronic
payments, has been the lack of security (see VIII for a survey). We will show that the
following security principles can be implemented using SMS messaging.
Authentication means that when a communicating party X claims to be X , we can
either be convinced that it is true or we can discover that X is in fact someone else and
hence lying.
Non-repudiation means that we can create commitments that are undeniable at a
later date. If party X commits to having produced a message M then later on this
commitment can be verified, and X can not deny having committed to M .
Confidentiality means that delicate information is available only to those parties that
it is meant for. An eavesdropper can not find out the content of confidential messages
without adequate credentials, such as an encryption key.
Integrity of data means that data can travel safely without a threat of being manip-
ulated, changed on the way. If data is manipulated, or tampered with, we can detect it.
We can not in general repair the tampered data, but it has to be retransmitted.
Furthermore, we will demonstrate applications of these security features in areas
of mobile commerce (publications VIII and IX), health care (publication V), and in a
measurement system (publication VI).

Chapter 2
Theoretical foundations
In order to be able to deliver the security features described in the previous chapter we
need to have cryptographic procedures. In the first application (publication I) that was
intended to fulfil some of these requirements an encryption method called Quasigroup
encryption was used. The Quasigroup encryption is especially well suited for mobile
devices due to the simplicity of the encryption/decryption procedure. The encryption
is essentially a sequence of table lookups and there are no computationally complex
arithmetic operations such as modular exponentiation. This makes the procedure very
efficient on devices with limited processing capabilities. Since the operations are very
simple, there is no need for specialised hardware for mathematical operations.
The following section describes this encryption method as well as some results of
the cryptanalysis of this cipher. The Quasigroup method has not been studied very
much from the cryptanalytic perspective in literature. The cryptanalysis we made
utilises the technique of differential cryptanalysis, which has become a common tool
in cryptanalysis. Our research (Publication II), however, uses a modified differential
method, since the original method was designed for an iterated block cipher which the
Quasigroup cipher is not.
With the quasigroup method confidentiality of data and one-factor authentication
can be achieved, but for the other requirements additional measures are required. Hash
functions combined with a PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) can be used to provide
integrity, non-repudiation and strong two-factor authentication. Futher sections handle
the PKI infrastructure that has been used to provide these security functions.
2.1 Quasigroup encryption
In order to introduce the Quasigroup encryption method, we here give some necessary
definitions. A groupoid is a finite set Q that is closed with respect to an operator ∗,
i.e., a ∗ b ∈ Q for all a, b ∈ Q. A groupoid is a quasigroup, if it has unique left and
right inverses, i.e., for any u, v ∈ Q there exist unique x and y such that x ∗ u = v and
u ∗ y = v [25].
This means that all operations are invertible and have unique solutions, which im-
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plies their usability as cryptographic substitution operations. With this in mind we can
define inverse operations for ∗, denote them \ (left inverse) and / (right inverse) . The
operator \ (resp. / ) defines a new quasigroup (Q, \ ) (resp. (Q, )) and for algebra
(Q, \, ∗)
x ∗ (x\y) = y = x\(x ∗ y) (2.1)
A quasigroup can be characterised with a structure called Latin square. A Latin
square is an n∗nmatrix where each row and each column is a permutation of elements
of a set. In our case |Q| = n.
Several other operations can be derived from the operation ∗ [26], but for our pur-
poses operations ∗ and \(right inverse) are sufficient.
2.1.1 Encryption
The encryption primitive el, l ∈ Q on sequence x1x2 . . . xn is defined as
el(x1x2 . . . xn) = y1y2 . . . yn where{
y1 = l ∗ x1,
yi+1 = yi ∗ xi+1(i = 1, . . . n− 1) (2.2)
The element l is called the leader and in our application it is derived from the secret
key (password). Transformation el is a mapping A+ → A+. Elements xi, yi ∈ A are
usually not characters, but entities of bits, where the bitlength of the element is defined
by the size of the Latin square associated with the quasigroup.
2.1.2 Decryption
Decryption dl : A+ → A+ is naturally a reverse operation of the encryption. It is
defined as dl(y1y2 . . . yn) = x1x2 . . . xn, where{
x1 = l\y1,
xi+1 = yi\yi+1(i = 1, . . . n− 1) (2.3)
In essence, the decryption primitive as well as the encryption primitive are table
lookup methods, where the Latin square associated with the quasigroup is used. In
encryption the previous encrypted element and the next not yet encrypted element are
used to find the corresponding value from the table. This value is then used as the new
encrypted value.
In decryption the values used for lookup are the previous already decrypted value
and the next not yet decrypted value. With these a new decrypted value is found from
the Latin square.
One application of the encryption method does not provide adequate security, since
cryptanalysing that would be a trivial task. For this reason a combination of encryption
and decryption primitives can be used with multiple quasigroups. In Fig. 2.1.2 is a
structural view of the encryption process where a1a2 . . . an represents the plaintext.
b1b2 . . . bn represents the ciphertext after one application of encryption and c1c2 . . . cn
after two applications.
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Figure 2.1: Structural view of encryption with k-1 iterations of the cipher
2.1.3 Differential Cryptanalysis of the Quasigroup Cipher
Differential cryptanalysis was originally presented by Eli Biham and Adi Shamir, two
Israeli cryptographers. Their analysis of DES (Data Encryption Standard) using dif-
ferential cryptanalysis showed how some bits of the key can be discovered in block
ciphers that have a Feistel structure [3].
The method of differential cryptanalysis is based on bitwise differences (XORs) of
input blocks and the analysis of corresponding output XORs of a certain component of
the cipher. These differences are collected into a table called a difference distribution
table. In the original paper by Biham and Shamir the target of this analysis was the
S-boxes of DES [4].
Differential attack is a chosen plaintext attack that uses a large amount of input
block pairs which have some predetermined bitwise difference. The goal of the attack
is to discover bits of a subkey used in a round of the cipher.
Differential cryptanalysis of the Quasigroup cipher revealed that one should use
Latin squares of higher order than four (see II for details). Considering a practical
implementation of the cipher this means that order eight would be the smallest Latin
square that gives adequate security and is practical to implement. In general, quasi-
groups of order 2k, where k is a small integer, are suitable for practical implementa-
tions. This is due to the fact that with an order four quasigroup one can encrypt two
bits, with order eight three bits and so on.
The complexity of the attack based on differential cryptanalysis of a Quasigroup
cipher depends on several variables. These include the amount of encryptions, the
number of used quasigroups, the order in which they have been applied and whether
any of these details are known to the attacker. The main idea of differential cryptanal-
ysis on the quasigroup cipher is to discover the structure of the Latin square used in
the encryption and ultimately the values of each entry in that Latin square. Finding the
structure of the quasigroup would give clear advantage compared to exhaustive search.
We derived a difference distributions table for a certain quasigroup using Algorithm
1, where ⊕ denotes a bitwise XOR operation.
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createDifferenceTable(Quasigroup Q):difference distribution table
(1) for (a1 := 0 . . . |Q| − 1)
(2) for (a2 := 0 . . . |Q| − 1)
(3) for (leader := 0 . . . |Q| − 1)
(4) c1 := e_transformation(leader,a1)
(5) c2 := e_transformation(leader,a2)
(6) input_xor := a1 ⊕ a2
(7) output_xor := c1 ⊕ c2
(8) distributions[input_xor][output_xor]++
(9) endfor
(10) endfor
(11) endfor
Algorithm 1. Algorithm used to generate pairs distribution tables from a quasigroup.
This analysis showed that there are some Latin squares of order 4 that produce
quasigroups that are weak against differential cryptanalysis (see II for details). How-
ever, on larger Latin squares weakness against differential cryptanalysis was found
only on very symmetric Latin squares. Analysis against non symmetric Latin squares
of order larger than 4 was not successful.
We also carried out a differential cryptanalysis to find a structure of the Latin square
from a ciphertext-plaintext pair. This analysis is statistical and requires quite a lot of
plaintext and ciphertext. The main goal of this analysis is to find the structure of the
Latin square. After the structure is found, the actual quasigroup can be found using a
relatively easy exhaustive search (see II for details).
To analyse the cipher we created an algorithm (Algorithm 2) for generating statis-
tical pairs distribution tables from ciphertext-plaintext pairs with multiple encryptions.
In the algorithm ai refers to the i:th element of plaintext. Respectively ci refers to the
i:th element of the ciphertext.
createDifferenceTable(plaintext a1 . . . an, ciphertext c1 . . . cn):difference distribution
table
(1) assign leaders[quasigroup order] with zeros
(2) while values left in ciphertext
(3) take the next n values ci . . . ci+n
(4) if leaders[ci] = 0
(5) leaders[ci] := 1
(6) foreach (ck . . . ck+n, ci . . . ci+n = ck . . . ck+n, i 6= k)
(7) input_xor := ai+n+1 ⊕ ak+n+1
(8) output_xor := ci+n+1 ⊕ ck+n+1
(9) distributions[input_xor][output_xor]++
(10) endforeach
(11) endif
(12) endwhile
Algorithm 2. Algorithm used to generate statistical pairs distribution tables from a
ciphertext-plaintext pair (n encryptions).
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Although successful with Latin squares of small oder, the statistical analysis re-
quired a very large amount of ciphertext-plaintext pairs for quasigroups of larger order
with multiple encryptions and did not suceed in most cases.
2.1.4 Generating Latin Squares
To generate a Latin square of order n, one needs an algorithm. A theory called "System
of different representatives" [27] has been used to generate random Latin squares. It is
also possible to assign values to a Latin square randomly, but this seems to be a slow
process in which a lot of tries has to be done. Since in the Latin square each row and
column must be a permutation of the values of the set, one has to back up very often in
the process of assigning the values in oder to maintain this requirement.
Finding a system to map another credential, for example a password, into a Latin
square would be a breakthrough for the quasigroup encryption. As Latin squares are
currently used as shared secrets, one needs to have a mechanism to distribute these
keys securely. A downside to all this is that a Latin square of cryptographically safe
order easily takes more space that encryption keys of comparable safety level in other
ciphers. This, however, can not be generalised as there is a trade-off in the quasigroup
encryption in terms of key size and encryption speed. Using smaller Latin squares
means that more iterations of the encryption needs to be done. The major advantage
when using a large Latin square is very easy and fast encryption. Using a 256*256 Latin
square means that encryption can be done a byte at a time resulting a fast encryption
with keysize of 64 kB. The number of Latin squares of this size is huge, the exact
number is not known (see II, p. 12. for details).
2.2 PKI and the FINEID infrastructure
Symmetric encryption can provide confidentiality and, combined with cryptographic
hash functions, integrity of data. It can also be used for authentication assuming that
the shared secret is known only by the communicating parties. However, applications
such as mobile payment solutions require non-repudiation which can not be achieved
using symmetric encryption.
Public key encryption has become probably the most important security concept of
computer communications since it was first introduced by Diffie and Hellman in 1976.
We have used public key encryption to achieve the security requirements stated earlier
for SMS messaging. Two different public key infrastructures (PKI’s) have been in use
in our research. One has been based on a key pair created on the device of the user (in
publication VII) and the other one has been based on a PKI provided by the Finnish
government.
To realise the PKI in publications IV, VII, and IX, we used the PKI provided by the
Finnish Population Register Centre [34]. The centre issues electronic identity cards to
Finnish citizens and permanent residents. The card holder’s private keys are stored in
the memory of this tamper resistant card. Moreover, there are no other copies of these
keys, and it is practically impossible to manufacture duplicates of the card. This suits
perfectly our requirements for authentication and non-repudiation.
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Finnish Electronic Identification (FINEID) [35] application manages the contents
of the electronic identity card and provides a command interface for performing pri-
vate key operations, such as, creating a digital signature. User authentication is accom-
plished using PIN (Personal Identification Number) codes.
Population Register Centre maintains an online certificate directory, namely the
FINEID-directory, which can be used to retrieve certificates of other users. Public
keys of each registered individual can be downloaded upon a search with appropriate
criteria. Besides that, a CRL (Certificate Revocation List) of invalid certificates is
available from the FINEID-directory. A certificate is placed on this list, for example,
in case the card containing the corresponding private key is lost.
Chapter 3
Technological foundations
In order to create an application that fulfils the security requirements we stated earlier,
several technological aspects have to be considered. In this chapter we give the neces-
sary technological background to understand how the applications were implemented
and what affected the decisions we made with the implementation. A reader familiar
with the Java Micro Edition (J2ME) may want to skip the chapter and refer to it as
needed.
As our solutions are Java applications, we cover the J2ME environment and some
of its APIs (Application Programming Interface) which are important for our purposes.
3.1 J2ME
J2ME (Java 2 Micro Edition) is a runtime environment specifically designed for de-
vices with very limited resources such as mobile phones or handheld computers. J2ME
is comprised of CLDC (Connected Limited Device Configuration) and Mobile Infor-
mation Device Profile (MIDP). A program developed for J2ME is called a MIDlet.
MIDlets use classes defined in APIs of CLDC and MIDP. There is no straight interac-
tion between a MIDlet and the device itself, since MIDlets are run by the Java virtual
machine (JVM). The architecture of J2ME is depicted in Figure 3.1. This architecture
limits the functionality a MIDlet can have into those provided by the runtime environ-
ment.
Basic Java language features and language libraries are contained in the CLDC
(Connected Limited Device Configuration). It contains API classes in the very heart
of the Java language, such as basic language constructs, input/output functionality,
utilites, and networking. Built on top of the CLDC, see Figure 3.1, the MIDP provides
classes that give additional functionality for a specific type of device [18]. The OEM
(Original Equipment Manufacturer) specific classes are classes provided by the device
manufacturer and are not present in all MIDP devices.
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Figure 3.1: J2ME architectural structure [18].
3.1.1 Wireless messaging API - WMA
The WMA is described in specification JSR-120 [19]. This API provides the means for
sending and receiving SMS messages (among other functions) using the GCF (Generic
Connection Framework), which is a part of the CLDC. CGF is also used by other types
of connections, such as TCP/IP and IrDA [40].
In the WMA, the class javax.microedition.io.Connector is used for creating a con-
nection. A new connection for SMS traffic is created as a MessageConnection object:
MessageConnection clientConn =
(MessageConnection)Connector.open
(protocol + outgoingaddress);
For SMS messages the protocol is sms://. The outgoing address is of the form
number:port, for example +5550000:4321.
The javax.wireless.messaging.MessageConnection class has methods for sending
and receiving SMS messages. Sending a message (byte array toSend) can be done as
described below:
String sAddr = "sms://+5550000:4321";
MessageConnection clientConn =
(MessageConnection)Connector.open(sAddr);
BinaryMessage message =
(BinaryMessage)clientConn.newMessage(
MessageConnection.BINARY_MESSAGE, sAddr);
message.setAddress(sAddr);
message.setPayloadData(toSend);
clientConn.send(message);
When receiving an SMS message, the application has to open a listening connection
for incoming messages. In our application (publication I) we implemented a method
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named openListeningSMSConn, which opens a connection and sets a listener to listen
to incoming messages.
protected boolean openListeningSMSConn()
{
try
{
conn = (MessageConnection) Connector.open("sms://:"+sPort);
conn.setMessageListener(this);
}
catch(Exception e)
{
conn = null;
}
return (conn != null);
}
The protocol always contains the string sms://, and the variable sPort is defined
by the application.
Once the connection is open, an instance of a message listener class implement-
ing the MessageListener interface is set using the setMessageListener method of the
Connection. A class implementing the MessageListener has to implement the notifyIn-
coming method, which the application wakes up upon receiving a new message.
3.1.2 Security and Trust Services API - SATSA
SATSA (Security and Trust Services API) is defined in the JSR-177 [17]. Among
other things it gives the programmer tools for handling the smart card properties of the
phone’s SIM card. In order to use the SIM as a cryptographic processor, there has to be
a way to communicate with the card. Using SATSA it is possible to send commands to
the card and get responses. These commands are called APDUs (Application Protocol
Data Unit). An example of this would be to send the card a message which the card
would sign using the private key stored on the card. The card would then return the
signature and the private key would never leave the card.
WIM (Wireless Identity Module) is a tamper resistant device, e.g. a smart card,
intended to be used in WTLS (Wireless Transport Layer Security) for identification
and authentication purposes [52]. In a mobile device WIM can be located on the SIM
card or on an external smart card [32]. WIM on a smart card can be accessed using
APDUs and the information structure follow the PKCS15 [37] standard.
3.1.3 Implementing permanent storage with Record Store
The Record Store (javax.microedition.rms) is a package containing classes used for
permanent storage. Details of how the storage is implemented on the device are left
to the manufacturer, and the API provides the programmer means to use the storage
without paying attention to details, such as file reading and writing. The device is also
responsible for guaranteeing that information in the storage is kept safe during power
off’s [18].
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A storage is opened with openRecordStore method. Records in the store can be
iterated using the enumerateRecords method and a new record can be inserted with the
addRecord method.
Methods for adding and retrieving records use byte arrays, which means that an
object to be stored must first be represented as an array of bytes. Similarly, the method
for retrieving data will return a byte array, which has to be converted into an object. As
neither MIPD nor CLDC implements java.io.Serializable [42], in our applications each
object that is stored, has a method for making a byte array presentation of the objects
state. Respectively, each stored object has a constructor that accepts a byte array as a
parameter and constructs the object with its original state.
In our messaging application presented in publication III, sent and received mes-
sages are stored using the record store. Similarly, for easier use of the application, we
implemented a phone book with contacts. We used a personal user password to derive
an encryption key to encrypt certain values of stored messages as well as contacts. For
contacts, all values, hence name, number, and password are encrypted. This way the
contacts can be read only with the correct user password. Also different users can use
the same phone book and will only see their own contacts.
The payload of a stored message is already encrypted during transmission. With
sent messages also the date and the number of the recipient is encrypted, so that a user
sees only messages he has sent. For incoming messages the number is not encrypted,
since the user password is not always available when the message is received. This is
the case when the application is not running at the time of receiving a message. After
reading a received message, the user may choose to encrypt the message details, after
which, the message can be seen only in the inbox of that user.
Encryption of elements in the record store guarantees confidentiality even in cases
where the device is stolen or lost and hence could be accessed by an adversary. Ac-
cording to the European Commission [8], in Netherlands alone 198000 mobile phones
were stolen in 2002 and the Danish police estimated that 0,5 percent of mobile phones
are stolen yearly. Amount of accidentally lost or misplaced phones is probably much
greater, but reliable statistics are very difficult to find.
3.1.4 Cryptographic algorithms in J2ME
The J2ME does not specify means for doing cryptographic calculations. There are no
ready made classes for cryptographic processing in either MIDP or CLDC. This means
that one either has to implement them oneself or use a code from a third party. For
the Quasigroup encryption (in publication I) we implemented the algorithm ourselves.
For the PKI (in publication VII) we used a ready made package from the Legion of
the Bouncy castle. This package includes a large variety of different cryptographic
algorithms and helper classes [24].
3.1.5 Push registry
MIDP 2.0 introduced a construct called Push registry, which enables an application
to register inbound connections to AMS (Application Management Software). This
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feature allows AMS to start an application on arrival of a message that is meant for the
application.
Registering an application to the Push Registry can be done in two ways. We use
the static method of describing the Push Registry entry in the application descriptor
file. The line
MIDlet-Push-1: sms://:54321,SafeSMS,*
in the jad file registers all SMS messages with port 54321 to be handled by the SafeSMS
application (see III). This means that upon arrival of a text message on port 54321,
the message is directed to SafeSMS. In case the application is not running, it will be
lauched by the AMS. Static registrations last in the AMS registry until the application
is removed from the device.
The other way to make entries into the Push Registry is to do it at runtime inside
the application. This is referred to as the dynamic approach. A connection is registered
using the registerConnection method and can be removed with the unregisterConnec-
tion.
Sometimes it is necessary to know whether the application was started by the user
or by the AMS using the Push registry. Method PushRegistry.listConnections(true)
can be used to detected whether the application was started by AMS after an incoming
connection [43]. The boolean parameter true indicates that only connections with data
available are returned. If the string array returned by this method is empty, the ap-
plication was not started due to an incoming connection, although it might have been
lauched by the AMS due to some other reason, such as a timer.
3.2 Web Services and SOAP
Web Services are services that utilise the web technology and use XML based com-
munication over http. SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) is probably the most
common XML-based technology for message exchange over HTTP. One of the fun-
damental ideas behind the web service paradigm is the use of standardized commu-
nication interfaces, usually based on the WSDL (Web Service Definition Language).
This allows different clients to access these services in a uniform manner. The WSDL
description can be used by the clients to build their communication with the server
offering web services.
The J2ME Web Services API (WSA) is based on the JSR 172 and provides web
service functionality for J2ME applications [7]. For communication with web services
stub classes are needed in a MIDlet. Stub classes handle creation of outgoing SOAP
messages and parse incoming messages. From the programmer’s point of view using
web services is calling suitable methods of the stub classes. With Sun Microsystem’s
Wireless Toolkit (WTK) stubs can be created using the WSDL document describing
the web service.
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3.3 Application deployment
Development time application testing is often done on a phone emulator as well as
on a real device. The most effective way to deploy an application on a real device
is probably through a dedicated software that communicates with the device through
a USB cable, Infrared or Bluetooth. This allows the software developer to install an
application to a device for testing and debugging. However, the end user does not
always have the technical skills or equipment for deploying applications through a
phone management software.
The Over The Air download (OTA) brings a solution for end user deployment of
software for mobile devices [41]. In a typical scheme the user navigates to a download
page using, for example, GPRS and clicks on a link to start the download. The device
will first download the JAD (Java Application Descriptor) file, which tells the device
important information about the application, such as, the size of the application and
the intended Java configuration. The device can make decisions based on the details in
the JAD file whether to continue download. If, for example, the device does not have
enough space to accommodate the application, continuing the download is pointless.
After the application itself is downloaded, the device will install the application.
This installation is device dependent and there is no general scheme for it. It should
be noted that both the JAD file and the application JAR must have appropriate MIME
(Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension) types attached to them for the download in
order for the device to be able to handle them correctly.
Chapter 4
Secure SMS messaging
As it was stated earlier, SMS messages do not have adequate security for certain pur-
poses that require confidentiality or integrity of data. Furthermore, authentication in
GSM network is sometimes not adequate and there is practically no non-repudiation.
To create a solution that can provide the security measures for applications using
SMS messaging we implemented java classes both for symmetric and asymmetric end-
to-end encryption of SMS messages. These classes provide all four security measures;
confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation.
In the following sections we will cover implementation of end-to-end encryption
for SMS messaging using both symmetric and public key encryption. Also, we cover
how to implement strong two-way authentication, how to ensure integrity of data and
authenticate the communicating parties.
There is, however, nothing in our applications that restrict them to communicate
only via SMS. In fact a packet switched IP-based protocol over, for example, GPRS
suits the applications better in some cases than SMS messaging. Enabling SMS, how-
ever, allows an application to be used by a wider audience. Also, an end-to-end security
solution for voice in GSM was studied in [14].
4.1 Symmetric approach to SMS message encryption
Our first application (publication I) was targeted for the MIDP 1.0 platform. The re-
quirements that were set on the application were the following:
1. Encrypt an SMS message using quasigroup encryption and send it
2. Receive encrypted messages and decrypt them
3. Operate fast enough to provide acceptable service in an environment with rather
limited processing power
4. Be compact enough for use in mobile phone memory space
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Figure 4.1: Application installation, key generation and certificate creation
Confidentiality and authentication were achieved through symmetric encryption us-
ing one of two encryption algorithms; Quasigroup or Blowfish. Blowfish is an iterated
block cipher based on the Feistel structure [38] and was included into the study for
comparison. Messages were sent and received in a binary format using the WMA.
4.2 PKI solution for SMS messaging
Our PKI solution presented in publication IV is a MIDlet, which can send and receive
SMS messages in binary format using the WMA. We use RSA [46] algorithm for en-
cryption and SHA-1 [46] for creating hash values. Although there have been reports
(for example [51]) about problems in the security of SHA-1, we have adopted it since
we consider it secure enough for our purposes. Changing the algorithm to another one,
if need arises, is a straightforward task.
We use the Lightweight API from the Legion of the Bouncy Castle [24] which
was designed for the J2ME environment. A J2ME application is a collection of byte
code classes, which are packed into a JAR (Java Archive) file with some additional
informative files. The usage of the Bouncy Castle generates very large JAR files, due to
inclusion of classes from the library. We have used an obfuscator from proguard [23] to
minimise the JAR file size. The obfuscator removes all unused class files from the JAR
package making the package smaller. Obfuscation also makes reverse engineering of
the class files more difficult by, for example, replacing class names with shorter ones.
For developing the application we used Sun Microsystem’s WTK (Wireless Toolkit)
[45].
4.2.1 Installation
Figure 4.1 describes the download and installation procedure of our PKI solution. Be-
fore installing the software, details of the user have to be registered into the system.
These details are later used to create a certificate for the public key of the user. We
have used a Java Servlet with an HTTPS connection to enter the details of a user into
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a database (MySQL). During registration, the registration system generates a random
nonce which is later needed in registration of the user’s public key.
It is very important to reliably authenticate the user during registration. This is
due to the fact that the user is granted a certificate later on based on the information
provided during registration. We have adopted a strong authentication method based on
a governmental PKI infrastructure. This infrastructure, the FINEID [34], can be used
to produce legally binding digital signatures. The infrastructure is based on smartcards
issued by the Population Register Centre in Finland [34]. To use the smartcard the
client machine needs a client program such as the SETWEB [39] or the OpenSC [53].
However, there is nothing that ties the usage of the system to this authentication
method. An organisation using our system can choose any authentication method they
find appropriate.
Figure 4.1 shows an overall picture of the installation process. The software can
be installed using the OTA (Over The Air) provisioning, see phase 1 in Figure 4.1.
The device downloads the JAD (Java Application Descriptor) using an HTML/WML
browser. The JAD gives some descriptive parameters of the application, such as re-
quired space on the device. Based of the information given in the JAD, the AMS
(Application Management Software) will download a JAR file which contains all the
classes needed to run the program. The AMS takes care of installing the application
to the device. Along with the application, certificates of both the Certificate Authority
CA and the Authentication Server AS are downloaded.
The first execution of the application will initiate a key generation procedure, where
a 1024 bit private key and a corresponding public key are generated. The private key is
stored on the device inside a PIN (Personal Identification Number) protected PKCS12
[36] container. The public key is also stored but without PIN protection. Storing of
keys is done using the Record Store available in J2ME. The Record Store is guaran-
teed to maintain its content between power offs. An important observation in the key
generation process is that the private key is never transmitted outside the phone. This
ensures that a copy of this key cannot exist anywhere outside the phone.
The public key is sent to the server using an HTTPS connection, see phase 3 in
Figure 4.1. The nonce created during user registration with the phone number of the
user are needed to complete the certificate generation procedure.
4.2.2 Certificate creation
The server issues a certificate for the public key of the client. For generating the certifi-
cate we used the X509CertificateGenerator class of the Bouncy Castle. The certificate
generation process is hence automated and requires no human interaction. The CA
signs the certificate using the private key stored on the server. In order for the certifi-
cate to be verifiable in other devices, the CA certificate has to be issued by a known
CA, whose certificate has been included in the device during manufacture. Often it is
not possible by the user to add trusted root certificates into the device. The generated
user certificate is stored in a file on the server and details of the user are saved in a
database.
For the certificate generation, the client is authenticated with the phone number
and a random nonce, which is generated during the registration of the user. We use a
34 Chapter 4. Secure SMS messaging
Figure 4.2: Secure message exchange between two mobile devices
protected HTTPS connection for registering both the user information and the public
key. This insures that an adversary who can listen to the communication can not obtain
the random nonce used in certificate creation. The client authenticates the server using
the CA certificate that comes as a resource with the application package.
Usually certificates are stored in an LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Proto-
col) directory. We are, however, storing the certificates on our server and provide an
interface for retrieving generated certificates from our server. A phone number among
other criteria can be used for retrieving certificates from our repository. This is im-
portant, since one may receive an SMS message with no other information about the
sender except for the phone number.
4.2.3 Certificate retrieval
X509 certificates are usually stored in an LDAP directory, from which they can be
queried. The FINEID certificates can be queried from ldap.fineid.fi. These certificates
are needed when a mobile device wants to send a message to a recipient who uses a
FINEID smart card. Retrieving a certificate from the LDAP directory with Java is quite
straightforward, but we could not find an implementation of LDAP managing routines
for J2ME. The options were either to port the routines to J2ME or to construct a medi-
ator between our J2ME program and the LDAP directories. We chose the latter option
and constructed a Java Servlet which gets user’s details as parameters and searches an
LDAP directory for a certificate (see VII for details). A further motivation for this ap-
proach was that a phone number of the user is not often included in a certificate, but
we saw the phone number as a natural search criteria for finding a user’s certificate.
For handling LDAP directories we used classes from the com.novell.ldap package
[31]. These classes allow querying the directory and retrieving certificates.
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4.2.4 Message Exchange
Fig. 4.2 describes the steps of user A sending a message to user B. A retrieves the
certificate of B from the server if A does not have it from earlier communication.
A must also verify the certificate and check that it has not been revoked. Since the
CRL (Certificate Revocation List) can be quite large and the memory capacity of the
mobile device is rather limited, we propose the usage of OCSP (Online Certificate
Status Protocol) [29] for checking the status of the certificate.
In the rest of Section 4.2 we use the following notation: A and B are communi-
cating mobile users and IDX is a digital identifier of user X . In our system we use
the FINUID identifiers, which uniquely identify users in the FINEID system. SKX
is an RSA private (secret) key of user X and PKX is the corresponding public key.
ESKX denotes private key encryption using the private key of user X and H denotes
a hash function, SHA-1 in our case. TSX is a timestamp generated by the timestamp
server for user X . SIGX is a digital signature created by X using the private key
SKX . CertX is a certificate of user X and OSCPX is an OCSP token for a certificate
of user X . We denote a message with M and a signed, timestamped message with
MSG, MSG = M |TSX |ESKX (H(M |TSX)), where | denotes concatenation. The
authentication server AS is used to get timestamps, OCSP tokens and certificates of
other users.
Sending a message happens as follows:
1. A→ AS : IDB
2. AS → A : TSA, OCSPB , CertB (optional), where both TSA and OCSPB are
signed by AS.
3. A→ B : EPKB (M)|TSA|ESKA(H(EPKB (M)|TSA))
Confidentiality of the message exchange is gained through A encrypting the mes-
sage M with the public key PKB of B. To ensure integrity and non-repudiation
of the message, A digitally signs the encrypted message EPKB (M) and the times-
tamp by calculating a hash value h = H(EPKB (M)|TSA) and signing it with the
private key SKA. Since A is the only one in possession of this key, A is also the
only one capable of producing the signature SIG = ESKA(h). If highly accurate
time information is required, A can obtain a timestamp TSA from the server. The
timestamp is digitally signed by the server. When a timestamp is used, it is included
in the hash value calculation of A’s digital signature. Hence, A sends B MSG =
EPKB (M)|TSA|ESKA(H(EPKB (M)|TSA)). Instead of the timestamp we can also
use a sequence number. This means that the device does not have to contact the server,
which means less network traffic.
4.2.5 Message reception
B receives a message MSG = M ′|TS′A|SIG′A from A, where M ′ is assumed to be
the original message encrypted with B’s public key, TS′A is assumed to be the original
timestamp TSA and SIG′A is assumed to be A’s signature as described above.
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B verifies A’s signature SIG′A by decrypting the signature with PKA and compar-
ing that to the hash value H(M ′|TS′A). If B doesn’t have A’s certificate, B retrieves
the certificate from the server. Again, using the OCSP, B can query the status of A’s
certificate. If the certificate proves to be valid, B can continue processing the message.
B can also get a timestamp TSB from the server and verify that TS′A and TSB are
within an acceptable time window. If both the timestamp and the signature are valid, B
concludes that the message came from A, was not tampered with and is recent, hence
it is not a replay of some earlier communication. Only after a successful signature
verification B proceeds to process the actual message.
B can recover the original messageM by decrypting the received messageM ′ with
the private key, hence ESKB (M ′) = M , where SKB is the private key of B.
In a nutshell, the whole procedure happens as follows:
1. A→ AS : IDB
2. AS → A : TSA, OCSPB , CertB (optional), where both TSA and OCSPB are
signed by AS.
3. A→ B : EPKB (M)|TSA|ESKA(H(EPKB (M)|TSA))
4. B → AS : IDA
5. AS → B : TSB , OCSPA, CertA (optional)
6. B:
(a) Check that H(M ′|TS′A) = EPKA(SIGA)
(b) Check that TSB < TS′A + k, where k is the predefined time window
(c) M = ESKB (M ′)
The timestamps are used to avoid any replay attacks. The time window k for accept-
able delay has to be short enough to be effective against such attacks, yet long enough
to allow reasonable network delay. An additional security measure can be taken by the
recipient B storing the last received timestamp of each sender A. The stored timestamp
can be used to verify freshness of a timestamp the next time a message is received. This
same measure is used with sequence numbers.
One SMS message can accommodate 140 bytes of data. With text messages this al-
lows sending a total ot 160 characters when each character uses 7 bits. This means that
in many cases more than one SMS message is needed to carry one protocol message.
For digital signatures we use RSA algorithm, which means that the signature length is
a multiple of RSA block size. Using RSA keysize of 1042 bits, one signature takes 128
bytes, only 12 bytes short of one SMS message.
4.2.6 User authentication
To authenticate a mobile user we have created a two-way authentication protocol based
on the challenge-response scheme. An information system can send a challenge nonce
N to the device using an SMS gateway. The message is assigned a port number, which
4.2. PKI solution for SMS messaging 37
states that the message is intended for our application. The AMS (Application Manage-
ment Software) can automatically start the MIDlet upon receiving the message. Using
a PIN code, the user can sign the challenge and send it back to the server. Obviously,
it is not a very good idea to use ones private key to sign a random value on which
one has no control. Rather, the client makes a calculation using the challenge and a
random value the client has generated and signs the result. This result with the client’s
random value are sent to the server. By verifying the signature the server can be sure
that the client is authentic. Also, the client can authenticate the server by verifying the
signature the server sends.
Steps of the protocol for an information system IS sending a random challenge
nonce N to a client C, C committing to this challenge and IS processing the commit-
ment are as follows.
1. C initiates the protocol by asking for an access to a protected resource and offers
IDC and a random nonce NC to IS.
2. IS → AS : IDC
3. AS → IS : OCSPC , CertC (OCSPC is signed by AS and CertC is optional)
4. IS → C : EPKC (NIS)|ESKIS (H(EPKC (NIS)|NC)), where NIS is a random
nonce generated by IS.
5. C → AS : IDIS
6. AS → C : OCSPIS , CertIS (OCSPIS is signed by AS and CertIS is op-
tional)
7. C → IS : MSG = M |SIGC ,where
M = EPKIS (NIS |NC) and
SIGC = ESKC (H(EPKIS (NIS |NC)))
8. IS:
(a) ESKIS (M) = N ′IS |N ′C
(b) If H(N ′IS |N ′C) = EPKC (SIGC)
⇒ NIS = N ′IS and NC = N ′C
The digital signature can be also used to show commitment to a contract between
C and IS. Since the client is the only party in possession of the private key, this com-
mitment is undeniable. The procedure would be similar to the one presented above,
except that the nonce NIS would be replaced by a contract CONIS−C to which C
would commit by signing ESKC (H(CONIS−C |NC |TSC)). The procedure would in
this case be initiated by IS, so the first phase could be omitted. However, some method
is needed for C to authenticate IS.
Our system relies on SMS messaging in communications. Other means of commu-
nication are perhaps better suited for communicating with the server when one wants to
retrieve certificates or OCSP responses. The need to consult the server can be omitted
with designing the protocol for authentication by using the designated Authentication
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Server AS. The certificates of both the CA and AS are downloaded with the applica-
tion. The IS can request a signed and timestamped OCSP token OCSPIS from the
CA or AS. This way the client C can verify the certificate of IS without opening a
connection to CA or AS using the token and the certificate of CA.
4.3 PKI approach using PKI-SIM
Using a SIM card with PKI capability changes the scheme in a couple of ways. There
is no longer a need to create keys on the device and the certificate has been created
to the user by the system. Registration of user details can be done the same way, but
obviously this has to be done before the card is issued to the user.
The PKI-SIM approach provides better security as the card is used as a secure
cryptographic co-processor. This means that critical cryptographic processing is done
on the card using the card’s processor [10]. The secret key of the user is stored inside
this tamper resistant card and it is practically impossible to extract the secret key from
the card. Also, making copies of the card is infeasible.
In order to access extended features of the SIM-card (the security application), the
J2ME environment requires an optional package, namely, The Security and Trust Ser-
vices API (SATSA) [17]. Among other features, the SATSA specification defines meth-
ods for communication with applications on the SIM card, by exchanging messages in
the APDU format [16]. There are some solutions that use the SIM card for strong au-
thentication, but these solutions have been based on the SIM application toolkit (SAT)
[11] and require SMS messaging between the card and an information system. These
solutions do not facilitate third party applications to be developed.
We developed and tested our application in a partly simulated environment. We
used a combination of:
• Real SIM cards with FINEID functionality;
• PC smart card readers;
• Simulated mobile phone with SATSA capabilities: SATSA Reference Imple-
mentation 1.0 [44] developed by Sun Microsystems, Inc.
FINEID public directory provides certificate search services using Lightweight Di-
rectory Access Protocol (LDAP) [31]. Since we did not find any implementations of
LDAP for the Java 2 Micro Edition platform, we had to use one more mediator. A
Java servlet accessible through an HTTPS server accepts certificate search requests,
executes them using FINEID-directory LDAP server, and forwards search results (cer-
tificates) back to the caller. The servlet is also used for retrieving timestamps needed
in protocols defined later.
4.4 EMS dispatch and Notification systems
Public healthcare has continuous pressure to cut costs as the population especially in
developed countries is aging. One direction to look for savings is making health care
more cost effective through use of information technology.
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We found that two different ways have been used to utilise SMS messages in the
health care domain [47]. Firstly, text messages were used to various reminders. Main
point was to improve patients’ compliance to the care at the appointed time, for exam-
ple, arriving to the doctor or to get a vaccination [5, 50]. The other way to utilise SMS
was to send information from patients home to the clinical information systems about,
for example, different kinds of measurements done by a patient with diabetes [22, ?].
How the security issues were dealt with was not mentioned in the articles.
European Union directive on privacy and electronic communications (2002/58/EC)
gives regulations on protection of the privacy of individuals. The directive aims to
harmonisation of regulations in Member States considering protection of fundamental
rights and freedom. The directive sets limits on the collection and use of personal
data in electronic communication [9]. Same kind of regulations are included in HIPAA
(Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996) regulations in USA [21].
Each country in Europe has its own, more exact, legislation regarding the handling of
personal data in the health care domain. Main issue of those regulations is to protect
individual’s privacy, which is a fundamental base for confidential relationship between
health care professionals and patients. We suggest a way to fulfil those requirements in
case of using SMS messages in health care.
The ability to encrypt messages opens a wide variety of possibilities in several fields
of health care. Our applications provide a safe storage for sent and received messages.
When the messages include some delicate information such as patient data, it is very
important that the messages in the phone cannot be read by outsiders. Currently there
are solutions, where text messages are used, but there is no way to avoid a disclosure
if the device is lost and the user has not deleted the received messages. Such systems
include for example a system for sending assignment messages to emergency response
teams, which in Finland often contain patients name and description of the emergency.
Clearly this kind of messages should not be disclosed to a third party. There are various
situations where patients or health care professionals would like to get a list of the
patients’ medication, for example, patients’ appointment to the private sector or health
care personnel in home care or in emergency situations. In case of asking information
from health care providers’ databases by SMS, it is essential to authenticate questioner
by adequate means.
Our approach using symmetric encryption combines the phone number and the se-
cret password to authenticate the user. Even in the case where an adversary can access
the phone, he still does not have the necessary password. He can use any password,
but in that case it is trivial to detect the fraud in the receiving end. In our case, where
the EMS staff uses SSN (social security number) to retrieve the list of medication of
a patient, the probability that a SSN encrypted with a wrong password decrypts to a
valid SSN is extremely small, 10−19 (see publication III for details). The sending party
(for example a hospital) will use a password registered between itself and the sender.
Upon receiving the list of medications, the adversary is met with a task of decrypting
the response. This is as hard as trying all the possible keys of the encryption algorithm,
provided that the password is properly selected.
Using public key encryption, the authentication can be done using a digital signa-
ture. This approach would be compatible with the recent development of information
security in health care.

Chapter 5
Mobile payments and protocols
In publication IX, following [20], we define mobile payments as wireless transactions
of monetary value from one party to another where a mobile device (e.g., mobile phone,
PDA, smartphone or any mobile payment terminal) is used in order to initialise, activate
and/or confirm the payment. There are several ways to categorise mobile payments.
Several different parameters, such as value, the transaction method or purchase type,
can be used for categorisation. Publication IX summarises and categorises a number
mobile payment systems.
The simplest mobile payment schemes on the market today rely on either call-
ing or sending a text message to a premium number, which is later charged from the
subscriber in the phone bill. The problem with this approach is the inadequate au-
thentication and lack of non-repudiation. The user can claim that he did not make a
particular call or send a certain message and the operator is faced with a very difficult
task of proving the opposite. Without adequate security, the risks involved in mobile
payments are too great for any operator to manage, and hence, most of these payment
systems handle only micro payments essentially less than $20 of value.
A network operator usually concentrates on providing network services and does
not have the capability to provide the service expected of a credit institution. For
this reason, most mobile payment solutions use a mediator of some kind and this also
creates additional cost.
There are PKI implementations of mobile payments on the market that solve the
problem of non-repudiation. With these solutions transactions of larger values can
be handled securely since they can provide non-repudiation. However, the solutions
we found were implemented using the SIM toolkit and required operator involvement.
Also, current (2006) implementations of the mobile FINEID are tied to the operator due
to a proprietary encryption mechanism in the communication between the card and the
authorisation server. This ties the solution to a specific network operator and to a spe-
cific credit organisation (issuer). Our solution is based on a PKI system administered
by the government. In essence the main difference is that our system authenticates
citizens instead of customers of a specific credit institution or network operator. This
makes the system open to users of any operator or credit institution.
This chapter summarises the protocols we have written for mobile payments. The
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secure message exchange described in the previous chapter is a building block that is
necessary for the payment protocols to be realised. We describe two different protocols;
One for virtual point-of-sale (POS) and another one for real point-of-sale. By real POS
we mean a situation, where the buyer is physically present whereas virtual POS means
a situation where the seller and the buyer do not physically meet.
5.1 Payment protocols
Our mobile payment scheme includes the following parties. A customer is a user of
a mobile hand-held device. The customer has received a SIM card with the FINEID
applet, which includes the public key certificate of the user and a corresponding secret
key. Identity of the customer is their Finnish Electronic User ID (FINUID).
A merchant is an owner of a point-of-sale terminal (or a vending machine) or a
service provider that accepts mobile payments. The merchant has a secret key and a
corresponding public key certificate registered in the FINEID system.
A bank or another credit organisation like VISA or MasterCard is a financial insti-
tution that acts as a payment processor. The customer has an account in the bank, or
has been issued with a credit card operated by it. If the customer has multiple accounts
or credit cards within the bank, the bank has been informed which of them should be
used for mobile payments. The bank has the right to charge the customer’s account or
credit card when presented with a payment order signed with the customer’s secret key.
In this section we describe two mobile payment protocols: one for a virtual POS
payment, and another for a real POS (vending machine) payment. The following nota-
tion is used in the description: C is a customer, M is a merchant, andB is a bank. IDX
is the identity of subject X . SKX is the secret RSA key of subject X , and PKX is
the corresponding public key. CertX is the public key certificate of subject X . {m}K
denotes RSA encryption of the message m under the key K. SIGXY is a digital signa-
ture generated by X , intended to be verified by Y . H is a hash function; we use SHA-1
in our protocol.
5.2 Virtual POS Payment
The protocol for a mobile virtual POS payment contains the following steps (see Fig.
5.1):
Service request. In phase 1, the customer initiates the protocol with the merchant by
requesting product options. The request may contain information which limits possible
options, such as date and time.
C
Service request // M
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Figure 5.1: Virtual POS Payment Model
Service options. In phase 2, the merchant sends a list of options to the mobile device.
The list includes short descriptions of products and pricing information. The merchant
also attaches its certificate to the list of options.
M
Service options|CertM  C
Product selection. In phase 3, the customer is prompted by the mobile device to
select a product from the list. The information on the customer selection is sent to the
merchant. The selection is signed using the private key of the customer. The message
is
C
MSG=
{
PD|NC |TSC |{H(PD|TSC)}SKC |SIGCB
}
PKM
SIGCB={H(TSC |IDM |AM)|H(PD|NC)}SKC
 M
where PD is a string that describes product details, NC and TSC are a random nonce
and a timestamp generated by the customer C and AM is the amount of money the
purchase will cost.
Payment request. Phase 4 of the protocol includes the merchant sending the pay-
ment details to the credit company. This payment information is signed using the mer-
chant’s private key and encrypted using the the public key of the credit company. The
message in phase 4 includes merchant’s details and payment details, such as amount,
id of the customer and the signed message received in phase 3.
M
MSG={IDM |IDC |TSC |AM |H(PD|NC)|SIGMB |SIGCB}PKB
SIGMB={H(IDM |IDC |TSC |AM |H(PD|NC))}SKM
 B
In this message SIGCB is the same signature as in phase 3. After receiving this mes-
sage the credit companyB checks that the timestamp TSC is newer than the timestamp
of the previous communication to detect any replay attacks.
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Payment confirmation. The indicated amount of money is transferred from the ac-
count of the buyer to the account of the seller. Phase 5 is initiated by the credit company
if this transaction can be processed and finalised. The credit company sends a confir-
mation message to the merchant. The message is signed using the private key of the
credit company.
B
MSG={H(IDM |IDC |TSC |AM |H(PD|NC))}SKB // M
From this message the merchant can check that the payment was made with the agreed
amountAM and from the account ofC to the account ofM . The hash valueH(PD|NC)
is meant for the customer to make sure that the merchant can not claim that the cus-
tomer bought something else than the original product.
Product delivery. Finally, in phase 6, the merchant checks the message received in
phase 5. If the message is valid and the payment has been done, the merchant delivers
the product to the customer. The merchant also sends the customer a message stating
that the payment has been made and the product has been delivered.
M
MSG={H(IDM |IDC |TSC |AM |H(PD|NC))}SKB // C
The customer can check that the amount of money AM , product details PD, the nonce
NC and the timestamp all match the original values to be sure that he paid the correct
amount for the correct product.
Use case: Buying a train ticket
Our protocol could be used, for example, to buy tickets for public transportation. These
tickets are sometimes of considerable monetary value. At the same time, it is expensive
to maintain ticket sales offices. Buying a train ticket would happen as follows:
1. The customer inquires for journey options by sending an SMS message to the
train operator. The message includes the starting point, the destination point,
date, and, perhaps, approximate time of the planned journey.
2. The train operator responds with all possible connections matching the query,
along with pricing information.
3. The customer selects a suitable journey and sends a request to the train company.
The request includes an identifier of the chosen connection and customer’s credit
account details. The credit account details are encrypted with the public key of
the credit company, and hence are not readable by the train company. The order
is signed by the customer.
4. The train company sends the credit company the payment amount and its de-
tails signed and encrypted with the public key of the credit company. Also, the
credit account and payment order details sent by the customer are included in
this message.
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Figure 5.2: Protocol overview
5. After receiving the message from phase 4, the credit company checks the signa-
tures of both the customer and the train company, debits the customer’s account
and sends a reply to the train operator. The reply contains a payment receipt
signed by the credit company.
6. The train company issues a digitally signed electronic ticket. The ticket is sent
to the customer along with the payment receipt. In the train, the conductor can
verify the electronic ticket, if necessary, by a code stored in the train company’s
information system.
5.3 Real POS (Vending Machine) Payment
Our protocol for a secure vending machine payment contains the following steps (see
Fig. 5.2):
Initiation. In phase 1, the user C initiates the protocol with the merchant M by
choosing a product. In case the vending machine supports several ways of payment, the
user may need to explicitly select the mobile payment option. Optionally, the protocol
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can be initiated by the vending machine, which detects the device when it comes in the
range of the Bluetooth communication. No messages are sent in this phase.
Bluetooth pairing. To enable exchange of messages, Bluetooth pairing must be per-
formed between the vending machine and the mobile phone. In case there is a possi-
bility that several devices are in the range, the machine can use a random PIN code for
pairing and show this PIN on its display. User must enter this PIN code in the mobile
phone.
Bluetooth pairing. If the user has not selected a product yet, the vending machine
sends a message with information about available products and their prices. In case
phase 1 was initiated by the user, and the product is already selected, the list of products
contains only the selected item. In addition to this data, the vending machine sends its
own certificate CertM and a random nonce NM .
M
MSG=CertM |NM |List of products // C
After receiving the message, C extracts M ’s certificate and checks its validity.
Product selection. The user is prompted by the mobile device for selection of a prod-
uct, unless it has already been selected. The information on the user selection is sent to
the vending machine. Also, the certificate CertC holding the user’s public key is sent
to the device.
The mobile phone must store the price AM of the selected product, as it will be
needed later for payment.
The message in phase 4 consists of three parts. The first part is the user selec-
tion S, and a nonce NC generated by the mobile device. This part of the message is
encrypted with the vending machine’s public key PKM . Second, the user’s certifi-
cate CertC is appended to this message. The last part of the message is a signature
SIG = {H(S|NM |NC)}SKC .
C
MSG={S|NC}PKM |CertC |SIG
SIG={H(S|NM |NC)}SKC
// M
After receiving the message, M extracts C’s certificate, verifies it, and decrypts
the signature SIG obtaining h = H(S|NM |NC). After this M decrypts the message
MSG obtaining S and NC . To conclude, M calculates the hash h′ = H(S|NM |NC)
and verifies that h′ = h. The vending machine could also check the certificate revoca-
tion list to see that the user certificate has not been revoked, but this checking can also
be made responsibility of the bank.
Payment request. In phase 5 of the protocol the vending machine sends a payment
request to the mobile device. The request is signed using the vending machine’s private
key SKM .
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The payment details include the account number ACNM , and a reference id of
the vending machine IDM . Note that the price of the product is not sent with the
payment details, since C already knows it. However, it is included in the second part
of the message. Namely, C’s certificate, price of the product AM , and two nonces NM
and NC are concatenated, hashed, signed with the vending machine’s private key and
appended to the message MSG. The last part of the message is a signature SIG ={
H(ACNM |IDM | {H(CertC |AM |NM |NC)}SKM )
}
SKM
.
M
MSG=ACNM |IDM |{H(CertC |AM |NM |NC)}SKM |SIG
SIG=
{
H(ACNM|IDM|{H(CertC|AM|NM|NC)}SKM )
}
SKM
// C
C will later send the signed hash of C’s certificate, price and both nonces to the
bank B. The bank will use (and optionally store) it as a proof of transaction authorisa-
tion by vending machine. This way C can not offer one certificate to M and another
to B, or change the amount to be paid. The signed hash can also be stored by C as a
receipt from the vending machine. Combined with a receipt from the bank (see phase
7), it can be used later as a proof of purchase if a dispute arises.
After receiving the message MSG, C verifies the signature SIG using M ’s public
key.
Creation of a payment order. In phase 6 the mobile user C communicates with
the bank B. In addition to the information received from M in the previous steps, an
account number of the mobile user ACNC and a timestamp TS are needed for the
transaction.
C creates a payment order
PO = ACNC |ACNM |IDC |IDM |AM |NM |NC |TS|H(CertC |AM |NM |NC))SKM .
The payment order is sent to the bank encrypted with the bank’s public key and signed
with the C’s private key.
C
PO=ACNC |ACNM |IDC |IDM |IDB |AM |TS|{H(CertC |AM |NM |NC)}SKM
MSG={PO}PKB |SIG; SIG={H(PO)}SKC
// B
In this message everything except C’s account number ACNC was received from
M in the previous stage. The bank B is obviously the one in which the mobile phone
user has an account.
Here we assume that the mobile device already has the public key of the bank.
Certificates of participating banks can be installed into the device when the software is
installed. We can also include a procedure for importing a certificate of a bank which
has joined the protocol after the software was installed.
Payment processing. After receiving and decrypting the payment order, the bank
verifies C’s signature attached to it. For this, the bank retrieves C’s certificate from
the FINEID LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) directory; IDC is used
as the search key. In the same way the bank gets M ’s certificate in order to verify
the signature {H(CertC |NM |NC))}SKM . This is done to make sure that the same
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certificate and nonces were used in communication between C and M . In addition, the
bank checks that neither of the certificates have been revoked. The bank also compares
the timestamp TS to the stored timestamp of the previous payment order received
from C (if any) to defeat replay attacks. Upon successful pass of all checks, the bank
transfers the amount of money from C’s account to M ’s account. In case M ’s account
is in another bank, usual interbank procedures are used for crediting money to M . If
the transaction can be processed and finalised, the bank initiates the phase 7, where it
encrypts and sends a confirmation message (receipt) to the mobile phone.
The receipt provides a proof that the payment has been made. The bank account
number of the vending machine, amount of money and nonces NM and NC are hashed
and signed using the bank’s private key:
B
MSG={H(ACNM |AM |NM |NC)}SKB // C
C has all the information needed for calculation of the same hash and verification
of the bank’s signature.
Proof of payment. In phase 8, the mobile phone forwards the bank receipt to the
vending machine. In order to specify which bank’s public key must be used for verifi-
cation of the receipt, the bank’s id IDB is included in the message.
C
MSG=IDB |{H(ACNM |AM |NM |NC)}SKB // M
We assume that the vending machine already has certificates of participating banks.
Therefore, the vending machine can decrypt the receipt using the bank’s public key.
The vending machine then calculates hash H(ACNM |AM |NM |NC) and verifies that
its value is the same as in the receipt.
The vending machine must have a list of valid public key certificates of different
banks. The vending machine does not need to have a network connection, the protocol
may be extended to check the validity of bank certificates by forwarding Online Cer-
tificate Status Protocol (OCSP) requests through the mobile phone to a trusted OCSP
server.
5.4 Traffic analysis
Analyzing the amount of traffic in the protocols is not quite straightforward as there are
numerous factors affecting it. When using public-key encryption, the keysize directly
affects the amount of data needed for one protocol message. With a 1024 bit (128
byte) keysize one block of ciphertext is 128 bytes in length, meaning that one digital
signature will need 128 bytes.
In section 4.2.4 A sent a message to B as follows:
1. A→ AS : IDB
2. AS → A : TSA, OCSPB , CertB (optional), where both TSA and OCSPB are
signed by AS.
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3. A→ B : EPKB (M)|TSA|ESKA(H(EPKB (M)|TSA))
Obviously, the first message of the protocol can be delivered as one binary mes-
sage. The second message of the protocol may require more than one SMS message,
depending on keysize. The timestamp TSA takes one RSA block since it is signed;
the same is true also for the OCSP response OCSPB . The time information can be
of variable length, depending on the accuracy requirements. A considerably accurate
timestamp of 12 bytes fits well in a 140-byte long SMS message, along with a signature
(assuming that a 1024-bit long RSA key is used). Similarly, the OCSP response (cer-
ificate serial number and status byte) fits into 12 bytes, so the timestamp and the OCSP
response together take two SMS messages. The optional certificate CertB can have a
varying size, but commonly it will be near a thousand bytes. Although the certificate
needs to be acquired only once, rather than transmitting it through SMS we propose
using a packet data connection or preinstalling certain certificates with the application.
In the third message, the length of the first part EPKB (M) obviously depends
on message M and is a multiple of the cipher block size. In general, the length of
EPKB (M) is
⌈ |M |
b−1
⌉
b, where b is the RSA cipher key size in bytes and |M | is the
message length in bytes. The length of the third part equals the cipher block size,
as the hash value is shorter than the cipher block size. The protocol message size
requirements in other protocols can be analyzed similarly.

Chapter 6
Conclusions and future work
SMS is probably the most used data service in the GSM network and it is used in vast
amount of applications, such as reminder or dispatch systems. In cases where confi-
dentiality is required, symmetric end-to-end encryption can be used. As this service
is not built in devices, an application can be installed on the device to achieve this
functionality.
With the increase of capable devices, the number of mobile services have increased
steadily. Modern devices can offer a wide range of services including mobile com-
merce and mobile government services. These services obviously require security
services as users expect confidentiality and correctness of transactions. At the same
time service providers expect reliable authentication of users and non-repudiation of
transactions.
Today, the most common method of payment in electronic commerce is a credit
card. A fraud in payment using an magnetic stripe credit card is a real risk, since
with magnetic stripe credit cards authentication of the credit card user is poor. Non-
repudiation in current systems is practically impossible to achieve, since the credit
card user surrenders all of the authentication credentials to the seller. A PKI system
can solve the problem as the digital signature can be created only by the owner of the
private key. Credit cards, such as the EMV (Europay-Mastercard-Visa) system that use
a chip instead of the magnetic stripe, have overcome these problems.
Among users, SMS has superior availability in comparison to networked computers
or credit cards. People tend to carry their mobile phone with them so that it is available
more often than a computer with a network connection. This makes the market for
mobile payment through mobile phone superior to the above mentioned alternatives.
6.1 Symmetric encryption
Our application for symmetric end-to-end encryption (publication I) provides confi-
dentiality of messages. It can furthermore be used in authentication and access control,
since we assume that the shared secret is known only by authorized parties. The phone
book relieves the user from remembering different passwords shared with different
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users. Storing contacts in the phone book is safe, since they can be accessed only with
the user password.
The novelty of this approach was in the ability to send and receive encrypted mes-
sages between mobile devices. Also, the application can be installed to a wide range
of mobile devices that otherwise have no messaging security solution.
In applications, where access control is vital, our application can be used to au-
thenticate the sender of a message. The phone number and the password can be used
as credentials, like in any password based authentication. Also it is possible to detect,
if the message has been corrupted or tampered with during transmission. Most im-
portantly, the messages containing delicate information are stored securely and remain
undisclosed even when the device is accessed by an adversary.
6.2 Public key encryption
Symmetric encryption can not provide a solution to the sometimes crucial requirement
of non-repudiation. For this reason the application that uses symmetric key encryption
is not suitable for delivering security to areas like mobile payments.
The public key encryption scheme we described provides strong authentication of
communicating parties, non-repudiation, integrity and confidentiality. Non-repudiation
is especially important in situations where a message is used to show commitment, for
example, to an order. Using PKI we can be sure that a signature was really made
by the person in possession of the private key. Since the keys are created within the
cryptographic token and the private key is never exposed outside it, we can be sure that
a valid signature of a user cannot be forged.
Strong user authentication is a crucial requirement for the development of commer-
cial mobile services. The use of governmentally administered PKI can significantly
increase trust in modern electronic commerce, to the benefit of both service providers
and their customers.
We see a lot of potential in using our applications in a wide range of mobile ser-
vices. SMS technology is a mature and well-tried service in the GSM network and has
superior availability in GSM networks globally. Using PKI with OCSP generates more
traffic and in the last two publications (VIII and IX) the communication was based on
packet data (UMTS or GPRS, depending on availability). Combining these commu-
nication methods we can obtain a very good platform to develop services for mobile
authentication, access control, e-commerce and other areas where secure communica-
tion is needed.
6.3 Payment protocols
Based on a public key infrastructure we proposed a novel mobile payment scheme. The
scheme can be used in real POS (Point-Of-Sale) as well as in virtual POS. The main
advantage of our system is that it does not require any mediator. This reduces the total
cost of a payment. We also described two protocols, one for virtual POS and another
one for real POS.
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Our system utilizes a governmental PKI infrastructure, namely the FINEID, mak-
ing it an affordable solution since the administration of the system is provided by the
government. Furthermore, as citizens have adopted this system for secure electronic
transactions, it has a high level of trustworthiness. Our system is built using Java to
gain the best possible portability across device platforms.
Our proposed MP solution provides strong two-factor authentication of communi-
cating parties, integrity of data, non-repudiation of transactions, and confidentiality of
communication. By using a governmentally administered PKI system we authenticate
citizens instead of customers of a certain operator or credit institution. This makes the
system open to all merchants, financial institutions and mobile users.
6.4 Future work
One of the optimatizations we did not consider in our papers is compression of mes-
sages when using SMS in communication. Compressing messages before encryption
might make messages shorter when symmetric encryption is used. With asymmetric
encryption, the encrypted part has a fairly uniform length that depends on the modulus
size. With encrypted messages compression is not really an issue as encrypted data
should exhibit a rather random structure. If the encrypted data shows regularities, it
may be used to attack the cipher.
As stated earlier, in our PKI implementations for mobile payments (publications
VIII and IX) we used packet data as our communication solution. Usage of SMS
messaging in this scenario seems also quite possible, but further study concerning the
reliability and cost would be in order. Certain changes should be done since, for exam-
ple, the author’s FINEID certificate is more than 1400 bytes in size meaning more than
ten messages if transferred via SMS. Using only SMS, a number of certificates should
be installed with the application.
The Quasigroup encryption is a rather new encryption method that has not been
studied very much by the cryptographic community. There is still a lot to do on the
security analysis of this cipher. From the implementational aspect one interesting chal-
lenge would be to be able to generate a Latin square based on a password. This map-
ping would enable to use a password as a shared secret instead of using latin squares
as secrets. Currently a password can be used as a shared secret dictating the selection
of leaders, primitives and latin squares as shown in the Fig. 2.1.
One very interesting usage of Quasigroup encryption could be implementing white-
box cryptography [6]. It seems that as the nature of Quasigroup encryption is es-
sentially based on table lookup, implementing whitebox cryptography would be more
straightforward than with block ciphers, such as DES or AES.
NFC (Near Field Communication) is an RFID (Radio Frequency Identification)
based technology for short-range wirelss communication that has been used for exam-
ple in smart posters and Bluetooth fast pairing. The communication range is typically
0-20 centimetres facilitating touch-to-launch applications [12]. NFC could be used to
expedite the Bluetooth pairing phase of the real POS payment scheme presented in 5.3.
At the moment (23.10.2007) there are a couple of NFC enabled phone models on the
market and the penetration of NFC enabled mobile phones is estimated to grow rapidly
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[1]. It is also possible to have data interchange between two NFC devices so that both
devices generate their own radio fields (also called the active operation mode) in com-
parison to the passive mode in which only the reader/writer device generates the radio
field and the tag merely responds. This implies the usability of NFC communication as
a transfer media in protocol 5.3 instead of Bluetooth.
In the message exchange in 4.2.4 timestamps are used to show the freshness of
messages. This is done mainly to protect users against replay attacks. It can also later
be used to demonstrate the time a message was created. This type of timestamp does
not, however, protect a user if the user’s private key is compromized. An enhancement,
where the user sends a hash of the message to the authentication centre could be used.
This way the timestamp would be tied to a particular message and even in the situation
where the private key is compromized, it would be possible to determine whether the
message was created before or after the key was blacklisted.
The current implementation of the FINEID on the PKI-SIM ties the user to the net-
work operator as it uses a SAT applet that communicates with outside systems through
encrypted SMS messages. This encryption is proprietary and hence the applet can-
not be used by third parties. In order to open the system for third party application
developers, the scheme should be modified so that the PKI-SIM would contain the
same FINEID application as the ID cards. Cooperation between the PRC and network
operators would be necessary to realize this.
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